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NOTES AND COMMENTS
STATUTORY IMMUNITY

To

FIREMEN

The law appears well-settled that a municipal corporation, in the
absence of statute, is immune from liability for injury or damage arising
from the negligent acts, whether of commission or omission, of the memIt was, until recently, equally
bers of its police and fire departments.'
well-settled in this state that the immunity granted to the municipality
did not extend to the individual policemen 2 or fireman, 3 either of whom
might be held for his own carelessness. Legislative enactments, however,
would appear to have produced a complete revolution of these principles,
for since 1931 the municipal government has lost the immunity it previously enjoyed, 4 while the municipal employees have obtained an exemption not heretofore recognized. 5 There is occasion to doubt, however,
whether the immunity granted to the firemen is as total as it would, at
(1893).
See also
1 Wilcox v. City of Chicago, 107 Ill. 334, 47 Am. Rep. 434
Cooley, Municipal Corporations, Ch. 12, p. 376. The test to be applied, of course,
is the "governmental v. proprietary" test: Seasongood, "Municipal Corporations:
Objections to the Governmental or Proprietary Test," 22 Va. L. Rev. 910 (1936).
particularly pp. 914-5, and cases there cited. An attempt to depart from this
doctrine was made in Fowler v. City of Cleveland, 100 Ohio St. 158, 126 N. E. 72,
9 A. L. R. 131 (1919), where the court distinguished between the determination to
have a fire department, said to be a governmental function, and the actual performance of that department once it was established, considered to be a proprietary
service. That attempt was nullified in Aldrich v. City of Youngstown, 106 Ohio St.
342, 140 N. E. 164, 27 A. L. R. 1497 (1922). Statutory action to destroy immunity
Municipal liability for tortious acts of
has since been regarded as necessary
policeman is discussed in Taylor v. City of Berwyn, 372 Ill. 124. 22 N. E. (2d) 930
(1922); Evans v. Kankakee, 231 111. 223, 83 N. E. 223, 13 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1190
Craig v. City of Charleston, 180 111. 154, 54 N. E. 184 (1899) ; Culver v.
(1907)
City of Streator, 130 Ill. 238, 22 N. E. 810 (1889) ; Sykes v. City of Berwyn, 320
Ill. App. 440, 51 N. E. (2d) 587 (1943), leave to appeal denied.
2 Manwaring v. Geisler, 191 Ky. 532, 230 S. W. 918 (1921) : Growbarger v. U. S.
F. & G. Co., 126 Ky. 118, 102 S. Al. 873 (1907) ; American Guaranty Co. v. McNiece,
111 Ohio St. 532, 146 N. E. 77 (1924). See also annotations in 53 A. L. R. 41,
39 A. L. R. 1289. 15 A. L. R. 192, 128 Am. St. Rep. 274.
3 Skerry v. Rich, 228 Mass. 462, 117 N. E. 824 (1917) ; Florio v. Jersey City, 101
N. J. L. 535, 129 A. 470 (1925). In the latter case the court stated: "We think
that a sound public policy requires that public officers and employees shall be held
accountable for their negligent acts in the performance of their official duties, to
those who suffer injury by reason of their misconduct. Public office or employment
should not be made a shield to protect careless public officials from the consequences of their misfeasances in the performance of their public duties."
4 Laws 1931, p. 618. § 1. The statute was repealed in 1941, but re-incorporated
without substantial change in the Revised Cities and Villages Act: Ill. Rev. Stat.
1945, Ch. 24, § 1-13. A more limited statute pertaining to policemen was enacted
in 1941: Il1. Rev. Stat. 1945, Ch. 24, § 1-15.
5 See statutes referred to in note 4, ante. The liability of a police officer is discussed in LaCerra v. Woodrich, 321 Ill. App. 107, 52 N. E. (2d) 461 (1943).
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-first glance, appear to be, judging from the holding in the recent Illinois
case of Hansen v. Raleigh.6
In that case, plaintiff sued the town of Cicero and the individual
defendant, fire commissioner of Cicero, to recover damages for injuries sustained in a collision between plaintiff's car and the official
automobile of the fire commissioner, when the collision occurred inside
the limits of the City of Chicago. Plaintiff relied on the fire commissioner's negligence in speeding, in disregarding a stop light, in the
wilful use of a siren, and also upon a general charge of wanton conduct. Action against the municipality was dismissed for want of statutory notice. 7 The individual defendant filed an answer denying negligence and also relied on the affirmative defense that he was responding to a fire alarm in Chicago, pursuant to agreement between the
municipal governments of Cicero and Chicago to render mutual assistance
in fighting fires, so was entitled to the benefit of the statutory exemption.
Thereafter, defendant moved to dismiss the action on the ground that the
allegations in the pleadings, not denied by way of reply, clearly showed
absence of liability. That motion was also supported by documentary evidence. Plaintiff answered such motion with the contention that the immunity statute was unconstitutional or, if not, that defendant was not
benefited thereby since he was a mere "observer"
when going to the
Chicago fire and was not there as a "fireman engaged in the performance
of his duties." Defendant's motion was sustained and the suit was dismissed. On direct appeal to the Illinois Supreme Court because the constitutionality of a statute was directly involved, that court held the
statute constitutional 8 but reversed on the ground that if, in fact, defendant was merely an "observer," he was not entitled to the statutory
immunity.
The statute relied upon declares that "in no case shall a member of a
municipal fire department be liable in damages for any injury to the
person or property of another caused by him while operating a motor
vehicle while engaged in the performance of his duties as a fireman." 9
The Illinois Supreme Court indicated that such statute permitted no
other construction than that the fireman must be acting "in the performance of his duties" at the time of any collision in order to have
the benefit thereof or else is not to be regarded as a "fireman."
The
6 391 111. 536, 63 N. E. (2d) 851 (1945).
7 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1945, Ch. 24, § 1-11.
8 It was argued that the statute was unconstitutional because contravening Ill.
Const. 1870, Art. IV, §§ 22-3, prohibiting special legislation releasing the indebtedness or obligation of a private individual to a municipal corporation. The statute
was held not to be a special law because it affected all members of the same class
alike and was based on a valid classification. The reasoning used was similar to
that in Bryan v. City of Chicago, 371 Ill.
64, 20 N. E. (2d) 37 (1939), which had
upheld another portion of the statute as it applied to the municipal corporation.
9 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1945, Ch. 24, § 1-13. Italics added.
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decision, however, gives little more than a working clue as to what may
be comprehended within the expression "in the performance of his duties
as a fireman." There was some indication from the pleadings that the
oral arrangement between the two municipalities existed for the purpose
of (1) mutual help in extinguishing fires in close proximity to municipal
borders in order to prevent conflagrations spreading across division lines
into the adjoining municipality; and (2) so as to provide the members of
the fire department of the smaller neighbor with an opportunity to obtain
training and experience in metropolitan fire-fighting methods. From dicta
used in the opinion, it would seem that if the defendant was en route to
assist in fighting a fire in the adjoining municipality, pursuant to instructions given by superior municipal authority, he would be entitled to
the immunity even though his purpose may also have been to gain training and experience. Whether defendant was or was not under any ditty at
the time becomes of primary importance in view of the construction
placed on the statutory language.
The municipality is, of course, subservient to the state so it is accepted law that municipalities can exercise only those powers granted by
the state. 10 Under a general grant of police power, or under the welfare
clause, a municipality may make such regulations and adopt such measures as may be necessary and reasonable to preserve the peace, order,
health, and safety of its citizens,11 but the corporate boundaries usually
mark a territorial limit for the exercise of the police power by a given
municipality. In matters concerning health, the municipal police power
may extend beyond the corporate boundaries, 12 especially if sanctioned
by statute, 13 but Illinois has no statute authorizing municipal subdivisions of the state to interchange fire equipment or apparatus, interchange
14
service, or even to contract for the interchange of equipment or service.
10

Dillon, Municipal Corporations, 5th Ed., § 237, pp. 448-9, states:

"It is a gen-

eral and undisputed proposition of law that a municipal corporation possesses and
can exercise the following powers, and no others; first, those granted in express
words; second, those necessarily or fairly implied in or incidental to the powers
expressly granted; third, those essential to the accomplishment of the declared
objects and purposes of the corporation,-not simply convenient but indispensable."
See also Hemingway, "The Extra-territorial Powers of a Municipality," 24 'Ky.
L. J. 107 (1936) ; Tooke, "Construction and Operation of Municipal Powers," 7
Temple L. Q. 267 (1933).
11 Cooley, Municipal Corporations, Ch. 10; McQuillan, Municipal Corporations,
Vol. III, § 895.
12 Chicago Packing & Provision Co. v. City of Chicago, 88 Ill. 221, 30 Am. Rep.
545 (1878).
13 IIl. Rev. Stat. 1945, Ch. 24, § 8-1.
14 The authority conferred by Ill. Rev. Stat. 1945, Ch. 24. § 23--74 to provide fire
protection to areas outside of municipal limits is restricted, by Ill. Rev. Stat. Ch.
1271/2, § 21 et seq., to the providing of protection to unincorporated and otherwise
unprotected areas. The authority to make contracts granted by Ch. 127%, § 31a,
is likewise limited to contracts between municipalities and adjacent organized fire
districts. It does not contemplate inter-municipal contracts such as the one involved in the instant case.
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If there was a statute and if the municipalities concerned had duly contracted thereunder, the defendant in the instant case might be said to be
under a duty so as to bring him within the immunity provision of the
statute provided he was, in fact, in the performance of his duties as a
fireman. Statutes of that character exist in Ohio 15 and in New York, 6
so that the members of fire departments in those states rendering service
outside of corporate boundaries pursuant to such contracts have the same
immunities and privileges as if performing duties within their own
areas. 17 The duty and the corresponding immunity is clear in such
cases. But while the town of Cicero, in the instant case, did pass a resolution authorizing the use of its fire equipment to aid its neighbor and
giving the commissioner leave to attend all fires in surrounding areas,
there was no enabling legislation authorizing such resolution. It would
appear, therefore, that the defendant could not be in the performance of
his "duties as a fireman" at the time of the accident so the court should
probably have held against his claim of statutory immunity on' this
ground alone. Any custom between the municipal governments could
not suffice for the New York court, in the case of Wieszczecinski v. Village
of Sloan,i 8 held that the habit of responding in reciprocity to alarms in
adjoining districts did not have the force of custom amounting to law,
especially where formal negotiations and agreements were lacking.
Another aspect of this subject, though not discussed in the Raleigh
case, is whether or not the immunity granted by the Illinois statute is
the same going to, as well as when returning from, a fire. An Ohio
immunity statute provides that the fireman's defense shall show that
he was "engaged in duty at a fire or while proceeding to a place where
a fire is in progress or is believed to be in progress or in answering any
other emergency alarm. '"19 There are no specific cases in point under
that statute, but an opinion by the Attorney General of that state
indicates that a municipal corporation is liable for the negligence of
members of the fire department in operating fire-fighting apparatus
when returning from a fire or other emergency alarm, 20 so it would seem
that the fireman would not have the benefit of the immunity provision
under like circumstances. 2 1 The Illinois court in the instant case drew
15 Page Ohio Gen. Code Ann., § 3698-60 and § 3741-1.
16 Cahill, Cons. Laws, Gen. Mun. Law, Art. 10, § 209 (1937 Supp.).
17 In re Gilbert, 165 Misc. 222, 300 N. Y. S. 790 (1938), appeal dis. 254 App. Div.
814, 4 N. Y. S. (2d) 753 (1938).
18 258 App. Div. 858, 15 N. Y. S. (2d) 958 (1939), reargument denied 258 App.
Div. 1033, 17 N. Y. S. (2d) 862 (1940).
19 Page Ohio Gen. Code Ann., § 3741-1.
20 Ohio, Opin. Atty. Gen. No. 1043.
21 The case of Fowler v. City of Cleveland, 100 Ohio St. 158, 126 N. E. 72, 9 A.
L. R. 131 (1919), suggests that the state of emergency and excitement attendant
thereon might be facts to be considered in determining if negligence was present.
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distinctions between the situation presented where a fire truck was going
to a fire and where it was returning to illustrate the point it was deciding. It may thereby be intimating an opinion that the local statute is
likewise limited. As it simply provides that a fireman shall not be liable
for damages to the person or property of another "caused by him while
operating a motor vehicle while engaged in the performance of his
duties as a fireman," the precise boundaries of this phrase are yet to be
delineated.
Much of the force of the argument in favor of immunity while
proceeding to a fire is lost when applied to the return trip. The fireman
is not then acting under the pressure of an emergency, where excessive
speed is necessary to protect the interests of the entire community. He
is, rather, acting in the role of an ordinary motorist. Test or practice
runs would seem to be in the same category, so the court well might, in
the interest of public safety, conclude that such activities were outside
of the scope of duties "as a fireman."
A closer question is raised where the fireman is responding to a
false alarm. The ordinary fireman, responding to a typical alarm,
could not know in advance what would be required of him, so it would
appear that the public interest would best be served by granting immunity for injuries caused during response to false alarms. The court,
in the Raleigh case, however, indicated that a possible limitation might
exist if the fireman had knowledge beforehand that fire-fighting was to
be the secondary purpose for the trip, as where he makes the journey
primarily for educational purposes. Consonant with that interpretation,
immunity would be denied for the negligent operation of fire trucks
and equipment in parades or shows.2 2 Moreover, the statutory immunity is limited expressly to the performance of duties as a fireman in
the operation of a motor vehicle, so negligent acts such as knocking down
a pedestrian when suddenly opening the firehouse doors, 23 or allowing
a child to fall through the polehole while taking him on a tour of the
firehouse, 24 would not come within the purview of the statute.
There is a definite trend away from the old rules as to the fireman's
individual liability for the negligent operation of a motor vehicle in the
performance of his duties.25 That trend is no doubt due to an increase
22

Blankenship v. City of Sherman, 33 Tex. Civ. App. 507, 76 S. W. 805 (1903).

23

Kies v. City of Erie, 135 Pa. 144, 19 A. 942 (1890).

The decision, however,
24 Nicastro v. City of Chicago, 175 Ill. App. 634 (1912).
antedates the immunity statute and is merely declarative of common-law principles.
25 Comparable statutes may be found in Mass. Gen. Laws, Ch. 41, § 100, and
Purdon's Pa. Stat. 1936, Title 75, § 212. The validity of the latter was sustained in
Mallinger v. City of Pittburgh, 316 Pa. 257, 175 A. 525 (1934). Policemen have
not been s~o highly favored: LaCerra v. Woodrich, 321 Ill. App. 107, 52 N. E. (2d)
461 (1943); Cavey v. City of Bethlehem, 331 Pa. 556, 1 A. (2d) 653 (1938).
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of official business, a lessening of personal performance, the rise of civil
2 6
service restricting the power of the officer to choose his subordinates,
an increase in government operations making the financial responsibility
of officers inadequate, as well as the inability of the officer to supervise
all work in detail.2 7 The vital character of the services performed by
firemen, moreover, justifies a liberal interpretation of an immunity
statute wherever the question is close, but we have yet to learn within
what narrow confines the Illinois Supreme Court may hold the statutory
immunity. The instant case does not signify a willingness to be too
liberal on the subject.
R. C. Emos

CIVIL PRACTICE ACT CASES
APPEAL AND ERROR-PARTIES ENTITLED TO ALLEGE ERROR--WHETHER
OR NOT APPELLEE MAY AMEND PLEADINGS TO MAKE SAME CORRESPOND
WITH PROOPS AND FINDINGS AFTER CASE REACHES APPELLATE TRIBUNAL--

Recourse was had by the Appellate Court for the Second District, in the
recent case of Leffers v. Hayes,' to Section 92(1) (a) of the Civil Practice
Act 2 in order to justify granting to an appellee the right to amend his
complaint in the reviewing court so as to make the same conform to the
proofs and findings. 3 That decision would seem to be a logical sequitur
to the earlier holding by the same court in Bollaert v. Kankakee Tile &
Brick Campany,4 which had denied to the trial court the power to permit
a similar amendment after the filing of notice of leave to appeal. 5 It does
come clearly within the language of the statute and at the same time cir26 An interesting point not considered in the instant case is the agency relation
between a fire commissioner and the fireman assigned to drive the vehicle. In
Dowler v. Johnson, 225 N. Y. 39, 121 N. E. 487, 3 A. L. R. 146 (1918), reversing
171 App. Div. 935, 156 N. Y. S. 1121 (1915), a new trial was directed to ascertain
whether the fire commissioner directed or encouraged the act of the fireman by
failing to protest at the excessive speed. Immunity provisions in force there are
limited to conduct occurring while proceeding to a fire. See also Nardone v. Milton
Fire District, 261 App. Div. 717, 27 N. Y. S. (2d) 489 (1941).
27 David, "Tort Liability of Municipal Officers," 12 So. Cal. L. Rev. 368 (1939).
' 327 Il. App. 440, 64 N. E. (2d) 768 (1946).
2 111. Rev. Stat. 1945, Ch. 110, § 216(1) (a). See also Section 259.50.
2 Plaintiff had sued to foreclose a mechanic's lien and predicated his original
complaint on a written contract. He subsequently filed an amended complaint
which, in effect, relied on an oral contract. The proofs disclosed, and the court
found, that the written contract was still In existence though orally modified in
some respects. A decree was granted on the latter theory although plaintiff did
not seek permission to amend the complaint. On appeal by defendant, the plaintiffappellee sought permission to amend his pleadings. Held: motion granted.
4 317 Ill. App. 120, 45 N. E. (2d) 506 (1942), noted in 21 CHICAGO-KENT LAW
REviEw 244.
5 Dove, P.J., who wrote the opinion in the instant case, dissented from the holding in the Bollaert case on the ground that Ill. Rev. Stat. 1945, Ch. 110, § 170(3),
expressly recognized the right to amend after judgment.
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cumvents the cumbersome procedure which would otherwise necessitate
reversal of the trial court holding for variance between allegation and
proof only to have that court permit amendment after receipt of the mandate so as to lay the foundation for another appeal. *If the decision rests
upon sound legal principles, it could be marked as a happy solution to a
dangerous trap created by the earlier holding. But therein lies the rub,
for while the statute purports to confer authority to permit such amendment, there is occasion to doubt its validity at least so far as it applies to
proceedings pending in the Appellate Courts of the state.
While some original jurisdiction is vested in the Illinois Supreme
Court, 6 the constitutional authority for the existence of Appellate Courts

in this state definitely indicates that such tribunals shall be reviewing
courts only 7 and they cannot exercise functions properly attributable to
courts of original jurisdiction.8 Direct amendment of the Appellate
Courts Act to confer original jurisdiction would violate constitutional
mandate, while indirect attempt to so do would present even more obvious
grounds for condemnation.. Other sections of the Civil Practice Act purporting to grant original jurisdiction to the reviewing courts of this state
have already received judicial disapproval 9 so there is no reason to sul)pose that the instant section is any the less vulnerable unless it can be said
that granting leave to amend the pleadings is not an exercise of original
jurisdiction. When it is remembered that the reviewing court must take
the record as it finds the same, 10 that subsequent action by the trial court
does not affect the existing record," and that, heretofore, amendment after
an appeal was taken was never allowed, 12 there can be no question but
6 See Stanley and Severns, "The Original Jurisdiction of the Illinois Supreme
Court," 22 CHrCAGo-KENT LAW REvIuw 169 (1944), particularly pp. 194-5.
7 Ill. Const. 1870, Art. VI, § 11.
8 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1945, Ch. 37, § 32, declares:
"The said appellate courts created
by this Act shall exercise appellate jurisdiction only.......
See also People v.
Hoyne. 262 Ill. 82, 104 N. E. 255 (1914) ; Dahlberg v. Chicago City Bank & Trust
Co., 310 Ill. App. 231, 33 N. E. (2d) 747 (1941) ; Riggs v. Barrett, 308 Ill. App. 549.
32 N. E. (2d) 382 (1941) ; Village of New Holland v. Holland, 99 Ill. App. 251
(1901), reversed on other grounds sub nom. Burchett v. People ex rel. Holland,
197 Ill. 593, 64 N. E. 543 (1902) ; Wabash R. R. Co. v. Kime, 42 Ill. App. 272 (1891).
9 111. Rev. Stat. 1945, Ch. 110. § 192(3) (c), purporting to authorize the reviewing
court to enter judgment according to the verdict when reversing a judgment notwithstanding the verdict, was declared a nullity in Sprague v. Goodrich, 376 Ill.
80, 32 N. E. (2d) 897 (1941), noted in 19 CHICAGo-KENT L.AW REv;Ew 275, and
Scott v. Freeport Motor Casualty Co., 379 Il. 155, 39 N. E. (2d) 9,99 (1942), noted
in 21 CHICAGo-KENT LAW REvimv 35. Section 92 of the Civil Practice Act, Ill. Rev.
Stat. 1945, Ch. 110, § 216(1) (d), authorizing the reception of evidence not introduced in the trial court, has been condemned in Schmidt v. Equitable Life Assur.
Soc., 376 Ill. 183, 33 N. E. (2d) 485 (1941), as applied to the Supreme Court. and
in Ockenga v. Alken, 314 Ill. App. 389, 41 N. E. (2d) 548 (1942), as applied to the
Appellate Courts.
10 Finn v. Glos, 268 Ill. 350, 109 N. E. 351 (1915).
But see Francke v. Eadie, 373
Ill. 500, 26 N. E. (2d) 853 (1940).
11 Barnard v. Dettenmaier, 89 Ill. App. 241 (1900).
12 Parker v. Shannon, 121 Ill. 452, 13 N. E. 155 (1887).
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what it is the province of the trial rather than the appellate court to settle
the record, including any pertinent amendment thereof, prior to appeal.
Desirable though the section in question may be, no other inference
can be drawn than that the Appellate Court possessed no valid warrant
for its action in the instant case. 13

DISCOVERY-DISCOvERY UNDER STATUTORY PROVISIONS--WHETHER OR
qOT CIVIL PRACTICE ACT PROVISION CONCERNING JUDICIAL POWER TO
kSSESS ADDITIONAL COSTS FOR FAILURE TO ADMIT FACTS IS ExCLUSIVE
-REMEDY AFFORDED LITIGANT-The plaintiff in a state court negligence
action based on the Federal Employer's Liability Act propounded certain
interrogatories and obtained a rule on defendant to answer. Defendant
failed to answer within the time fixed, apparently on the ground that the
court lacked power to order defendant to respond. Plaintiff moved for a
default judgment, but in lieu thereof the trial court found defendant in
contempt and assessed a fine. Defendant appealed, relying on the contention that the sole remedy afforded was for the court to assess the
expenses incurred by plaintiff in proving the matter not admitted as
additional costs, in the fashion provided by Section 58(2) of the Civil
Practice Act and Rule 18 of the Illinois Supreme Court. 1 It was held, in
Smith v. Thompson,2 that the provision of the Civil Practice Act and the
rule thereunder was not exclusive, had merely provided litigants with an
additional remedy,3 and had not operated to deprive the trial court of its
innate power to punish for contemptuous disregard of its orders.
While express statutory sanction exists for the use of contempt process
1. Rule 50 of the Illinois Supreme Court. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1945, Ch. 110. § 259.50,
can provide no better support for that action as it is fundamental law that a court
cannot, by rule, add to or detract from a jurisdiction conferred on it by law: Pisa
v. Estate of Marie Rezek, 108 Ill. App. 198 (1903), affirmed in 206 Ill. 344, 69 N. E.
67 (1903).
1 11. Rev. Stat. 1945. Ch. 110. § 182(2) and § 259.18(2). Rule 18 was held constitutional in Wintersteen v. National Cooperage & Woodware Co.. 361 Ill. 95,
197 N. E. 578 (1935). Relief under it has been granted in O'Connor v. Central Nat.
Bank & Trust Co. of Peoria, 306 I1. App. 414, 28 N. E. (2d) 755 (1940). Allowance of costs has been denied where the request for admission applies to facts of
controvertible character, Usalatz v. Pleshe's Estate. 302 111. App. 392. 23 N. E. (2d)
939 (1939), or the facts could not be admitted without qualification or explanation :
First Trust & Savings Bank v. Town of Ganeer, 296 I1. App. 541, 16 N. E. (2d)
806 (1938).
2 327 Il. App. 59, 63 N. E. (2d) 613 (1945). That decision was followed in the
simultaneous opinion in Knaebel v. Thompson, 327 I1. App. 21, 63 N. E. (2d) 614
(1945).
3 The remedy is similar to the one provided in cases where untrue statements are
made in pleadings: Ill. Rev. Stat. 1945. Ch. 110, § 165. But see, in that regard,
Hausman Steel Co. v. N. P. Severin Co.. 316 Ill. App. 585, 45 N. E. (2d) 552
(1942) ; Palmer v. Gillarde, 312 Ill. App. 230, 38 N. E. (2d) 352 (1942).
No allowance can be made where the question is raised simply by motion to strike: Awotin
v. Abrams, 309 Ill. App. 421. 33 N. E. (2d) 179 (1941).
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to coerce a recalcitrant witness in a deposition proceeding, 4 no such authority is to be found in Section 9 of the Evidence Act 5 which section was,
heretofore, the only one permitting a court to require parties to the litigation to produce books and writings in their possession containing evidence
pertinent to the issues being tried. The absence of such express authority,
however, did not prevent earlier courts from imposing penalties as for
contempt for wilful refusal to produce books and the like on order.,
The pertinent portion of Section 58 of the Civil Practice Act constitutes an innovation in the law regarding discovery as it clearly makes
possible, through rule of court, a much more comprehensive system for
obtaining evidence than was possible under any former practice. 7 But
there is nothing in it or in the accompanying rules to evidence any intention to limit the earlier coercive methods for compelling discovery, so
it would not be unnatural to suppose that such methods remain. The
decision in the instant case, the first since the adoption of the Civil
Practice Act, now holds that such other methods do remain. By so
deciding, the court has assured the bar that a wilful refusal to admit facts
without justification. may lead to more severe penalties than just the
imposition of additional costs.

4

Ill. Rev. Stat. 1945, Ch. 51, § 36.

5 Ibid., Ch. 51, § 9.
6 Swedish-American Tel. Co. v. Fidelity & Casualty Co., 208 Il1. 562, 70 N. E. 768
(1904), affirming a fine of $1,050, and Harrisburg Coal Min. Co. v. Ender Coal &
Coke Co., 272 Ill. App. 113 (1933), affirming fines totalling $2,000 as well as imprisonment for thirty days. But see Carden v. Ensminger, 329 Ill. 612, 161 N. E.
137, 68 A. L. R. 1256 (1928).
7 On the scope of discovery under -Section 58, see Finn, "Depositions and Pretrial
Discovery under the Illinois Civil Practice Act," 17 CHICAGo-KENT LAW REvIuw 301
(1939).

